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A SUMMONS TO THE MAGISTRATES’
COURTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND UGANDA
S.J. COOPER-KNOCK AND ANNA MACDONALD*
ABSTRACT
The expansive literature on law and justice across Africa emphasizes why
people do not use lower state courts. Consequently, a striking lack of
attention is paid to how and why people do engage with lower state courts.
Drawing on a systematic literature review and a multi-sited qualitative
study, we make three contributions on this topic. First, we explore how
this academic gap emerged. Second, we critique the procedural justice
model that currently underlies much ‘access to justice’ programming,
which seeks to improve citizens’ engagements with the courts. In place of
what we describe as its arithmetic assumptions about institutional engage-
ment, value, and legitimacy, we propose a trifactor framework. Citizen
engagement, we argue, occurs as people reconcile how they think the
courts should act, how they expect them to act, and how they need them
to act in any given instance. Third, drawing on our empirical studies,
we highlight that this framework is flexible enough to capture people’s
actually existing decision-making in a wide variety of settings and to map
how those trade-offs shift throughout the process of their case, providing
important insights into ideas of justice and statehood.
Introduction
APART FROM THE POLICE, LOWER STATE COURTS are where most cit-
izens interact with the state justice system. In the vast literature
that exists on justice across Africa, relatively little attention has been
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paid to these courts, often called magistrates’ courts in common law
countries and courts of first instance in civil law countries. Academic
research emphasizes peoples’ preference for non-state forms of dispute
resolution, pointing to widespread distrust of and lack of access to lower
state courts in areas of limited or contested statehood.1 Is it really the case
though that citizens eschew these courts? Drawing on empirical research in
South Africa and Uganda, we show that the picture is more complicated.
Further, we demonstrate how research on citizen engagement with lower
state courts can provide crucial insights into an emerging puzzle across the
continent: namely that engagement with rule of law institutions is regularly
sought in contexts where people are deeply critical of the state.2
Addressing the existing lack of attention to magistrates’ courts and their
equivalents (termed ‘lower state courts’ below)3 is important for two cen-
tral and overlapping reasons. First, scholarship is overlooking an important
part of the legal and justice landscape across Africa. The academic empha-
sis on citizens’ lack of familiarity with formal law and courts belies the fact
that actually, people are using the lower state courts in large numbers. It
has been estimated that on average, 13 per cent of citizens across the con-
tinent have had ‘contact with courts in the past five years’ as claimants,
respondents, defendants, or witnesses, yet we know very little about their
experiences.4 It is critical to appreciate why citizens are turning (or being
turned) to lower state courts and granting them a ‘right to arbitrate’.5 Sec-
ond, pervasive assumptions about the avoidance of lower state courts have
emerged in place of detailed empirical accounts of citizens’ actual engage-
ment with these institutions. There is something approaching an academic
and policy consensus on widespread problems of inadequate infrastruc-
ture, understaffing, costs, backlogs, and corruption in judicial systems at
all levels.6 Policy is influenced by procedural justice models which tell us
1. Brian Tamanaha, ‘Introduction: A bifurcated theory of law in hybrid societies’, in Mattias
Kötter, Tilmann Röder, Gunnar Schuppert and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Non-state justice
institutions and the law (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015), pp. 1–21; Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Na’im (ed.), Human rights under African constitutions (University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, PA, 2003).
2. This puzzle has become more apparent recently in literature on state-society relations
in African studies. For different analytical perspectives on this puzzle, see Sarah Dreier and
Milli Lake, ‘Institutional legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa’, Democratization 26, 7 (2019),
pp. 1194–1215; Christian Lund, ‘Twilight institutions: Public authority and local politics in
Africa’, Development and Change 37, 4 (2006), p. 693; Justice Tankebe, ‘Public cooperation
with the police in Ghana: Does procedural fairness matter?’, Criminology 47, 4 (2009), pp.
1265–1293; Susanne Verheul, ‘Zimbabweans are foolishly litigious’: Exploring the logic of
appeals to a politicized legal system’, Africa, 86 (2016), pp. 78–97.
3. This term excludes other courts in the lower tiers of the state justice system that are, for
example, tied to traditional authorities.
4. Caroline Logan, ‘Ambitious SDG goal confronts challenging realities’ (Afrobarometer
Policy Paper 39, 2017), p. 3. Interestingly, this remains constant across urban/rural and class
divides.
5. Dreier and Lake, ‘Institutional legitimacy’, p. 1209.
6. For an interesting collection of essays addressing these points, see: Brian Tamanaha, Car-
oline Sage and Michael Woolcock, Legal pluralism and development: Scholars and practitioners
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that rule-bound, transparent, courteous court processes will build insti-
tutional legitimacy, ensure citizens’ engagement, and secure compliance
with the law.7 Yet how relevant are procedural justice models of institu-
tional legitimacy to everyday life? In African studies, there has been little
interrogation of this model, even as it is increasingly critiqued in other con-
texts.8 This is despite a rich and growing literature on public authority and
statehood across the continent.9
This article begins to address major gaps in our knowledge about the
functioning of lower state courts and how people relate to the state through
them. Findings emerge from a systematic literature review of citizen
engagement with magistrates’ courts across Africa and multi-sited qual-
itative research on two magistrates’ courts in South Africa and Uganda.
This involved three months observing the district (or ordinary) courts of
Ntuzuma Magistrates’ Court and two months observing Gulu Magistrates’
Court, between 2015 and 2018, by the authors and four research assistants.
Both research locations are sites of long-term fieldwork by the authors on
topics related to law, policing, and justice. Our focus was on retributive jus-
tice, which focuses on punishment for offenders. We left aside alternative
forms of dispute resolution over issues such as land disputes and inheri-
tance that have been integrated into lower court processes. We observed
the routinized conduct of the courts, the practices of court professionals,
and the behaviour of citizens in courtrooms, corridors, waiting areas, and
behind closed doors. Observation was combined with semi-structured, in-
depth interviews with members of the judiciary, prosecution services, legal
representatives, and court-based civil society organizations. We interviewed
15 practitioners in Gulu and 11 practitioners in Ntuzuma and conducted a
focus group with five court mediators. To better understand citizen engage-
ment and experiences, we selected 10 cases in Gulu and 13 in Ntuzuma
to study in greater depth. Documentary trails were explored where possi-
ble, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with citizens involved
in the case. While we focused on those deliberately seeking contact with
the state justice system by reporting criminal cases or filing civil cases, we
also engaged (where possible) with individuals compelled to interact with
the courts as accused, defendants, or witnesses. We included a mix of civil
and criminal cases10 and ensured a diverse mix in terms of participant age,
7. Tankebe, ‘Public cooperation’; Daniel Nagin and Cody Telep, ‘Procedural justice and
legal compliance’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 13, 5 (2017), p. 6.
8. Dreier and Lake, ‘Institutional legitimacy’; Tankebe, ‘Public cooperation’; ‘World
development report 2017: Governance and the law’ (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017).
9. See, for example, Lund, ‘Twilight institutions’; Achille Mbembe, On the postcolony (Uni-
versity of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2001); Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard,
‘Negotiating statehood: Dynamics of power and domination in Africa’, Development and
Change 41, 4 (2010), pp. 545–546.
10. In Uganda, we examined four civil cases and six criminal cases; in South Africa nine
criminal cases and four civil cases. In this article all interviewees are referred to through
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gender, and occupation. Overall, we interviewed 35 citizens who had been
directly involved in court cases, with an additional focus group in South
Africa with four men exploring relationships between young men and the
courts.
Using interpretive thematic analysis, we coded why people engaged mag-
istrates’ courts in the broader life of a dispute and the impact of court
experiences on perceptions of state justice and statehood. Our findings
advance an important theoretical contribution in this area. Whilst not dis-
counting the importance of procedural justice, we find that this alone has
an unpredictable and/or indeterminate impact upon people’s perceptions
of the courts. Instead, we argue that citizen engagement with magistrates’
courts is shaped by the trade-off between normative, strategic, and prag-
matic considerations, which deserve further analytical exploration. That
is to say: how people ‘think’ state justice ought to function; how they
‘need’ it to function, and how they ‘expect’ it to function in any given
instance.11 In this tri-factor formulation, not only is legitimacy fluid and
multi-dimensional, it is also just one part of a larger calculation around the
utility of courts and the relationship of law to the “rest of life”. Although
we develop our argument within the context of literature on Africa, there
is nothing uniquely ‘African’ about our findings, as our references to other
research in the Global North and Global South demonstrate. Thinking
‘empirically’ rather than ‘judicially’12 about the lower state courts helps us
understand the diverse reasons why citizens are using them as regulatory
institutions, even in contexts where widespread distrust of the state and its
agents is evident.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we establish why lower state courts
have been neglected in studies of law and justice across Africa. This is
important because it reveals intersecting political and conceptual com-
mitments in knowledge production in this area. Next, we highlight the
limitations of procedural justice theory for conceptualizing citizen engage-
ment with magistrates’ courts. Then, drawing on our systematic literature
review and original empirical research, we introduce our novel tri-factor
framework to explore the complex ways in which citizens interact with
the lower state courts and how this interaction shapes judgements about
institutional legitimacy, utility, and statehood more broadly.
Explaining the presence of academic blinkers
For all the concern regarding statehood in African studies, our systematic
literature review, conducted in June 2016 and repeated in May 2019,
11. S.J. Cooper-Knock, ‘Everyday policing, statehood and sovereignty in South Africa: A
case study of responses to theft and robbery in eThekwini’ (unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion, University of Oxford, 2014); S.J. Cooper-Knock and Olly Owen, ‘Between vigilantism
and bureaucracy: Improving our understanding of police work in Nigeria and South Africa’,
Theoretical Criminology, 19, 3 (2015), pp. 355–375.






/afraf/article/119/477/552/5969485 by guest on 14 January 2021
556 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
revealed that relatively little academic attention has been paid to citizen
engagement with lower state courts. The systematic review involved a
database-driven search13 of all African countries in combination with the
name(s) of the relevant state court of first instance and a snowball search,
identifying relevant citations in our search documents. Inclusion criteria
required original, contemporary empirical material on citizen perceptions
of, and engagements with, courts of first instance; and/or professional
identities and performances in these courts; and/or detail on their every-
day functioning. We did not include studies that focused on the intended
functioning of courts or pieces where magistrates’ courts were referenced
relatively briefly. The most directly relevant studies were in Benin;14 Bots-
wana;15 Côte d’Ivoire;16 DRC;17 Ghana;18 Kenya;19 Malawi;20 Niger;21
13. SCOPUS, ISI, IBSS, EBSCO, African Journals Online, CIAO, Hein Online, West
Law, Google Scholar, Refseek, LSE library catalogue, COPAC and WorldCAT. Repeated
on Google Scholar in 2019.
14. Sophie Andreetta, ‘Why go to court if you overlook the judge’s decision? Inheritance
disputes and legal consciousness in Cotonou’, Politique Africaine, 149, 1 (2016), pp. 147–
168; Sophie Andreetta and Annalena Kolloch, ‘Money, morality and magistrates: Prosecuting
and judging in the Republic of Benin’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 50, 2
(2018), pp. 145–166; Thomas Bierschenk, ‘The everyday functioning of an African public
service: Informalization, privatization, and corruption in Benin’s Legal System’, Journal of
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 40, 57 (2008), pp. 101–139.
15. Athaliah Molokomme, ‘Children of the fence: The maintenance of extra-marital chil-
dren under law and practice in Botswana’ (African Studies Centre Research Report 46,
University of Leiden, 1991).
16. Peace Medie, ‘Rape reporting in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire: Accessing justice and
ending impunity’, African Affairs, 116, 464 (2017), pp. 414–434.
17. Benjamin Rubbers and Emile Gallez, ‘Beyond corruption: The everyday life of a
justice of the peace court in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in Tom De Herdt
and Jean-Paul Olivier de Sardan (eds), Real governance and practical norms in sub-Saharan
Africa (Routledge, New York, 2016), pp. 245–263; Milli Lake, Strong NGOs and weak
states: Pursuing gender justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018). Milli Lake, Ilot Muthaka and Gabriella Walker,
‘Gendering Justice in humanitarian spaces: Opportunity and (dis)empowerment through
gender-based legal development outreach in the eastern DRC’, Law and Society Review, 50, 3
(2016), pp. 539–574.
18. Richard Crook, ‘State courts and the regulation of land disputes in Ghana: The litigants’
perspective’ (Working paper series, 241, Institute of Development Studies, 2005); Richard
Crook, Kojo Asante and Victor Brobbey, ‘Popular concepts of justice and fairness in Ghana:
Testing the legitimacy of new or hybrid forms of state justice’ (Africa Power and Politics
Working Paper, London, 14, 2010).
19. Ambreena Manji, ‘The grabbed state: Lawyers, politics and public land in Kenya’, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, 50, 3 (2012), pp. 467–492; Makau Mutua, ‘Justice under
seige: The rule of law and judicial subservience in Kenya’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001),
pp. 96–118.
20. Jessica Johnson, In search of gender justice: Rights and relationships in matrilineal Malawi
(CUP, Cambridge, 2018); Ashworth, ‘Witchcraft, justice and human rights in Africa: Cases
from Malawi’, African Studies Review, 58, 1 (2015), pp. 5–38.
21. Oumarou Hamani, ‘L’administration des carrières des magistrats au Niger: Une ethno-
graphie du conseil de la magistrature’ (Lasdel Études et Traveaux, Niamey, 70, 2008). Alou
M. Tidjani, ‘La justice au plus offrant. Les infortunes du systeme judiciaire en Afrique de
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Tanzania;22 South Africa;23 Uganda;24 and Zimbabwe.25 Whilst using
online translation where possible, our inclusion of non-English texts was
limited. Moreover, our reliance on published academic work was prac-
tically necessary but excluded work in thesis form26 and grey literature.
Although our focused search parameters have inevitably limited our cov-
erage, we believe we have still systematically identified an academically
under-researched area and located valuable work on which to build.
Clearly, there are myriad forms of knowledge about lower state courts,
including those shared in family stories, debated on street corners, spo-
ken at community meetings, captured in state documents, and written
in reports. While academic scholarship has no a priori claim to superior-
ity over these diverse forms of knowledge, identifying a systematic gap in
published scholarship is important because it highlights a space for further
research and pushes us to understand the political and conceptual develop-
ments that produced this gap in the first place. Studies of contemporary law
and justice in Africa can be clustered into four strands, which explore legal
decision, interpretation, and case law; legal pluralism; transitional justice;
and the judicialization of politics. We now explore how and why the last
three strands of work might have addressed the citizen engagement with
lower state courts but have not done so.
22. L.L.A. Kyando and C.M. Peter, ‘Lay people in the administration of criminal justice:
The law and practice in Tanzania’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 5,
3 (1993), pp. 661–682; Andrew Mwakajinga, ‘Court administration and doing justice in
Tamzania’, in Stephanie Elbern and Christina Jones-Pauly (eds), Access to Justice: The role of
court administrators and lay adjudicators in the African and Islamic contexts (Kluwer Law Inter-
national, The Hague, 2002), pp. 231–251; Ulrike Wanitz, ‘Legally unrepresented women
petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 23,
30 (1990), pp. 255–271.
23. Lillian Artz, ‘Better safe than sorry: Magistrates’ views on the Domestic Violence Act’,
South Africa Crime Quarterly, 7 (2004), pp. 1–8; Tsoaledi Thobejane and Dikeledi Thobejane,
‘Experiences of women professionals speaking out against gender marginalization at magis-
trate offices in Limpopo province, South Africa’, Gender and Behaviour, 15, 2 (2017), pp.
8858–8866; Jameelah Omar, ‘Penalised for poverty: The unfair assessment of “flight risk” in
bail hearings’, South African Crime Quarterly, 57, 1 (2016), pp. 27–34; Diana Gordon, Trans-
formation and struggle: Crime, justice and participation in democratic South Africa (University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2009); Lazarus Kgalema and Paul Gready, ‘Transforma-
tion of the magistracy’ (Research paper, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation,
Johannesburg, June 2000). Lake, Strong NGOs and weak states.
24. J. Atukwasa, B. Basheka and P. Gadenya, ‘The effect of corruption on administration of
justice in Uganda’, African Journal of Public Affairs, 5, 3 (2012), pp. 1–15; Lynn Khadiagala,
‘Negotiating law and custom: Judicial doctrine and women’s property rights in Uganda’, Jour-
nal of African Law, 46, 1 (2002), pp. 1–13. Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church and Diana Chigas,
‘Faciliation in the criminal justice system’ (Occasional Paper, Institute for Human Security,
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2016).
25. Verheul, ‘Zimbabweans are foolishly litigious’.
26. E.g. Nonhlanhla Mbambo, ‘The processing of domestic violence cases by the depart-
ment of justice and constitutional development: The case of Ntuzuma magistrate court in
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Legal pluralism—the presence of ‘more than one “law” or legal system’
in any given ‘social field’—has preoccupied scholars across disciplines for
many decades.27 Yet studies of plurality elsewhere in the world analyse the
functioning of state courts in a level of detail unmatched across Africa.28
Merry attributed this to the fact that non-state ordering is more prominent
in countries with a colonial past and less visible in other contexts.29 Oth-
ers suggest that the co-development of legal systems with capitalism and
liberalism in western countries has rendered the moral and legal expan-
sion of state authority in the judicial field more complete.30 There is
truth to these arguments, but they overlook two key factors. First, the
evolution of literature on legal pluralism in Africa was shaped by norma-
tive ‘anti-statism’.31 This began as a conscious challenge to colonial and
post-independence scholarship that emphasized legal centralism and the
supremacy of state-based law in regulating society.32 Later, legal pluralism
scholars challenged the Marxian notion that customary law was a legitimat-
ing device for the state, emphasizing the flexibility of customary norms,
practices, and institutions, which existed as powerful sites of ‘resistance,
refusal, and struggle’.33
More recently, these efforts have redoubled in response to international
development policies seeking to advance state-centric ‘rule of law’ across
Africa. Scholars have emphasized the ‘fantasy’ of rule-of-law projects and
advocated for a better understanding of ‘actually existing’ governance.34
While donors now recognize the widespread legitimacy of so-called infor-
mal or traditional modes of justice, in practice, there is a tendency to instru-
mentalize these non-state or hybrid systems, pushing them to conform
to international justice norms.35 Scholars, in turn, have re-emphasized
27. Margaret Davies, ‘Legal pluralism’, in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford
handbook of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), p. 805.
28. Bierschenk, ‘Everyday functioning’, p. 102.
29. Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal pluralism’, Law and Society Review, 22, 5 (1988), pp. 869–
896.
30. Brian Tamanaha, ‘Understanding legal pluralism: Past to present, local to global’,
Sydney Law Review, 30 (2008), pp. 375–411; Davies, ‘Legal pluralism’.
31. Ibid., p. 809.
32. Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the problems of legal theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934);
Martin Chanock, ‘Neo-traditionalism and customary law in Malawi’, Journal of Legal Plural-
ism and Unofficial Law, 10, 16 (1978), pp. 80–91. Richard Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus lex: the
anthropology of human rights and transnational law’, in Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry
(eds), The practice of human rights: Tracking law between the global and the local (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 342–369.
33. Ibid.; John Comaroff, ‘Colonialism, culture and law: A foreword’, Law and Social
Inquiry, 26, 2 (2001), pp. 305–314.
34. Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, ‘Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict
and fragile states’, Conflict, Security & Development, 7, 4 (2007), pp. 503–528; Hagmann and
Peclard, ‘Negotiating statehood’.
35. Eva Wokowska, ‘Doing justice: How informal systems can contribute’ (United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 2006), p. 213; World Bank, ‘World devel-
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the complexity of these institutions, arguing that they cannot be sim-
ply co-opted into hegemonic state-building projects that fail to reflect
peoples’ political, social, and legal concerns,36 whilst also highlighting
the shortcomings of ‘vernacular forums’ for dispute resolution.37 While
acknowledging that non-state actors are not isolated from the state, state
laws, actors, and institutions generally appear on the fringes of these
accounts to explain how their non-state and hybrid counterparts have been
shaped.
The second strand of literature explored here—transitional justice—
has exploded, particularly since the mid-nineties, when South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were set
up.38 More recently, academics have explored the controversial role of
the International Criminal Court on the continent and other transitional
justice processes, such as Rwanda’s post-genocide Gacaca courts. Whilst
producing many valuable insights, this literature has created an unhelpful
division between top-down, state-centric ‘transitional’ justice and ‘ordi-
nary,’ ‘local’ justice.39 In fact, interrogations of ‘everyday justice’ amidst
transitional justice have been largely restricted to ‘traditional’ rituals, with
heated debates questioning whether such rituals can be utilized to achieve
transitional justice goals.40
The third and final strand of literature, which has neglected experiences
of lower state justice, explores the degree to which courts have become
guardians of the political order. This work focuses on state courts but con-
centrates on high courts or Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts.41
Scholars have, understandably, been drawn to analysing ‘the occasional
heroic experiences’ of statehood, citizenship, and judicial activism.42 What
this misses, however, are the everyday practices of the lower courts, which
36. Patrick Kyamusugulwa, Dorothea Hilhorst and Gemma Vanderharr, ‘Capacity builders
for governance: Community driven reconstruction in the eastern DRC’, Development in
Practice, 24, 7 (2014), pp. 812–826.
37. Sindiso Weeks, Access to justice and human security: Cultural contradictions in rural South
Africa (Routledge, London, 2017), p. 33.
38. Gerhard Anders and Olaf Zenker (eds), Transition and justice: Negotiating the terms of new
beginnings in Africa (Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2014).
39. Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds), Localizing transitional justice: Interventions and
priorities after mass violence (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2010), p. 2; Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule, ‘Transitional justice as ordinary justice’, Harvard Law Review, 117
(2003), pp. 762–825.
40. Tim Allen and Anna Macdonald, ‘Post-conflict traditional justice’, in Gerben Bruinsma
and David Weisburd (eds), Encyclopaedia of criminology and criminal justice (Springer, New
York, 2014).
41. A.A. Senghore, ‘The judiciary in governance in the Gambia: The quest for autonomy
under the second republic’, Journal of Third World Studies, 27, 2 (2010), pp. 215–248.
42. James Holston, Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil
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deal with less severe, less seminal but no less central practices of every-
day justice. There is a rich literature in South Africa, for example, on
the Constitutional Court’s adjudication of ‘non-judiciable’ socio-economic
rights.43 To the degree that magistrates’ courts and their equivalents enter
into this literature at all, they do so as the locus of ‘landmark’ decisions
or a precursor to high-level court action.44 Indeed, whilst mega-politics
might be decided in the higher courts, it is the lower courts that make the
daily decisions that bring substance to people’s political experiences and
subjectivities.45
Removing our blinkers: Interpreting citizen engagement with lower state courts
The previous sections demonstrated how and why key academic fields have
systematically overlooked citizens’ engagements with lower state courts.
Despite this, something approaching a policy consensus exists on the obsta-
cles to accessing justice, including lack of infrastructure, understaffing,
costs, backlogs, and corruption in judicial system at all levels. This has
justified various international interventions, including the UN Sustain-
able Development Goal (SDG) of ‘access to justice for all’ by 2030. Such
agendas seek to reverse procedural fairness problems in order to bolster
institutional legitimacy and are echoed, reinforced, and shaped by national-
level policies.46 Of course, reformers may share policies without sharing
motivations: some might be trying to bolster civic rights, whilst others
attempt to amplify state power and coercion through the courts.47 In
the following section, we explore reformist policies in their sociopolitical
context in Ntuzuma and Gulu before highlighting the limitations of pro-
cedural justice theory for conceptualizing citizen engagement with lower
state courts and suggesting an alternative way forward.
Access to justice in its socio-political context
Both Gulu, the provincial capital of the Acholi region of northern Uganda,
and Ntuzuma, a township in Kwazulu-Natal province of South Africa,
43. Mandisa Mbali, South African AIDS activism and global health politics (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, New York, 2013); Tshepo Madlingozi, ‘Post-apartheid social movements and legal
mobilisation’, inMalcolmLangerford et al. (eds), Socio-economic rights in South Africa: Symbols
or substance? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp. 92–130.
44. Marie Huchzermeyer, ‘Housing rights in South Africa: Invasions, evictions, the media,
and the courts in the cases of Grootboom, Alexandra, and Bredell’, Urban Forum, 14, 1
(2003), pp. 80–107.
45. An important exception being Mutua, ‘Justice under Seige’.
46. United Nations Development Programme, ‘Rule of law and access to justice in east-
ern and southern Africa’ (Geneva, 2013); Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), ‘Delivering access to justice for all’ (Paris, 2016).
47. Matt Andrews, Lance Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, Building state capability: Evi-
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experience high levels of crime and civil disputes relative to other parts
of the country. Court usage may also be similar. In both northern
Uganda and urban South Africa, Afrobarometer data states 12 per cent
of respondents had direct experience with ‘government courts’ in the
last five years.48 More broadly, both Gulu and Ntuzuma are located
in historically marginalized regions that have experienced high levels of
political violence, albeit in very different ways. They are also both areas
where the central government is investing in formal legal architecture and
access to justice programmes in attempts to consolidate and extend state
authority.
In South Africa, the law has arguably played a central role in the imag-
inary of the transition from apartheid. Under apartheid, residents in the
black township of Ntuzuma were oppressed by a ‘wicked system of law’49
as well as illegal state violence, entangled with clashes between Inkatha
and the African National Congress. The post-apartheid state promised to
transform, legitimize, and extend access to the legal system. In 2001, the
country’s Urban Renewal Program announced Ntuzuma, together with the
neighbouring areas of KwaMashu and Inanda, as an area of investment and
development. Ntuzuma Court is a US$14 million building serving roughly
1.5 million people in Bridge City, a purpose-built node of commercial
and state buildings in the ‘INK’ development. When the court opened in
2013, the government claimed it as a victory for ‘previously underserviced
communities’ that would ‘bring justice services closer to the people’.50 Pre-
viously, residents had to travel approximately 20 km to reach a civil or small
claims court. Such construction projects sat alongside forms of judicial and
institutional innovation, like the piloting of KwaMashu Community Court
in 200551 and the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in criminal
and civil matters, which attempted to make justice more responsive and
fiscally and temporally efficient.
While Ntuzuma Court blends modernist steel brutalism with a tree
design intended to invoke the old rural community courts, Gulu magis-
trates’ court mirrors the colonial-era architecture found in surrounding
municipal buildings. There has been a magistrates’ court in Gulu since the
1960s, but it was barely functional during the 20-year war (1987–2008)
48. Afrobarometer merged data, round 6 (2016), <https://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-
round-6-data-36-countries-2016>.
49. Arthur Chaskalson, ‘From wickedness to equality: The moral transformation of South
Africa law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1, 4 (2003), pp. 590–609.
50. SA Government News Agency, ‘State-of-the-art court for Ntuzuma’, 28 May 2013,
<https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/state-art-court-ntuzuma>.
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between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance
Army. Cases have only been heard again regularly for around 10 years.
During the war, GoU counter-insurgency policy forcibly displaced civil-
ians into unsafe camps. This legacy, combined with contemporary forms
of neoliberal ‘state violence,’ particularly in relation to land disposses-
sion has kept northern Uganda ‘far behind the rest of the country in all
development indicators’.52 During the war, there was ‘little or no judi-
cial presence’ across swathes of the Acholi sub-region and the courts sat
infrequently, mired by enormous backlogs.53 Since then, the National
Resistance Movement (NRM) government has established various devel-
opment programmes, ostensibly to improve regional governance and eco-
nomic development. The flagship Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
(PRDP), currently in its third iteration, prioritized the ‘consolidation of
state authority’, tackling the ‘sketchy’ presence of justice institutions and
the ‘inadequate, vandalized, and in some places non-existent’ magistrates’
courts in conflict-affected areas of the North.54 The programme’s focus has
now shifted from physical infrastructure to institutional performance.55
In sum, both states are seeking to extend the breadth and depth of lower
courts through programmes that seek to improve their physical presence
and procedure. This, however, is against the backdrop of deeply ambiva-
lent and contested imaginaries of statehood and ‘justice’ amongst citizenry.
In Gulu magistrates’ court catchment area, for example, it is widely held
that minor criminal offences and small-scale civil disagreements should be
resolved ‘from the home’ using clan elders, village or parish council courts,
or a combination of the two. The local council (LC) courts are a hybridized
system of dispute resolution, administered by elected local councillors at
the village and parish level with reference to notions of customary author-
ity and norms, as well as formal law.56 Within the catchment for Ntuzuma
court, whilst there is no parallel institutional structure to the LC courts,
diverse organizations, including churches, community police forums, street
committees, family structures, and political organizations, regularly play
de facto dispute resolution roles. No systematic data exists to suggest how
52. Adam Branch and Adrian Yen, ‘Neoliberal discipline and violence in northern Uganda’,
in Jorg Weigratz et al. (eds), Uganda: The dynamics of neoliberal transformation (Zed Books,
London, 2018), p. 88.
53. Human Rights Watch, ‘Uprooted and forgotten: Impunity and human rights abuses in
northern Uganda’ (Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC, 2005).
54. Ibid.; Government of Uganda, ‘Peace and recovery development plan 2007–2010’
(Republic of Uganda, Kampala, 2007), 4.1.3; Government of Uganda, ‘Peace and recovery
development plan phase two: 2012–2015’ (Republic of Uganda, Kampala, 2011), p. ii.
55. Government of Uganda, ‘Peace and recovery development plan 3 for northern Uganda:
2015–2021’ (Republic of Uganda, Kampala, 2014), pp. 14–15.
56. Julian Hopwood, ‘Elephants abroad and in the room: Explicit and implicit security,
justice and protection issues on the Uganda/S Sudan border’ (Justice and Security Programme
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central magistrates’ courts are in this landscape, but institutional and reg-
ulatory multiplicity does not crowd them out in either setting. Magistrates’
courts remain a means—however imperfect—of accessing state power, law,
judgement, and adjudication for those in search of redress and dispute
resolution.
Beyond procedural justice
For the last 30 years, the dominant theoretical approach to understanding
citizen perceptions of state legal systems has been the procedural justice–
legitimacy model, most commonly associated with social psychologist Tom
Tyler and colleagues.57 Tyler models a linear, causal relationship between
citizens’ perceptions of procedurally just treatment by legal officials and
public perceptions of the system’s legitimacy.58 Procedural justice is bro-
ken down into four dimensions, which reflect an individual’s perception of
being treated with, and subject to ‘dignity and respect, trustworthymotives,
neutrality and voice’.59 Procedural justice advocates vary in their definition
of ‘legitimacy’ but converge around a core question: ‘whether a power-
holder is justified in claiming the right to hold power over other citizens’
and, therefore, deliver binding judgements.60
While there has been a great deal of academic and policy consensus on
procedural justice theory, we concur with critical scholarship that questions
the ‘elegant set of causal relationships’ at the heart of these models.61 Our
scepticism is illustrated by a puzzle emerging from the 2016 Afrobarom-
eter survey data. In both South Africa and Uganda, the vast majority of
respondents perceived high levels of corruption, inefficiency, and unfair-
ness in the police and judicial system, and yet in apparent contradiction
to procedural justice predictions, these institutions were overwhelmingly
regarded as ‘legitimate’ in so far as a significant majority either agreed or
strongly agreed that state courts have ‘the right to make decisions that peo-
ple always abide by’.62 Two central critiques of procedural justice theory
57. Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, ‘Beyond procedural justice: A dialogic approach
to legitimacy in criminal justice’, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 102, 1 (2012),
pp. 119–170.
58. Ibid., p. 120; Nagin and Telep, ‘Procedural justice’, p. 6; Tom Tyler, Why do people
obey the law? Procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance (Yale University Press, New Haven,
1990); Tom Tyler, ‘Enhancing police legitimacy’, Annual Review of the American Academy of
Political Science, 593 (2004), pp. 84–99; Tom Tyler, ‘Psychological perspectives on legitimacy
and legitimation’, Annual Review of Psychology, 57 (2006), pp. 375–400.
59. Tyler, ‘Enhancing police legitimacy’.
60. Bottoms and Tankebe, ‘Procedural justice’, p. 124.
61. Devon Johnson, Edward Maguire and Joseph Kuhns, ‘Public perceptions of the legiti-
macy of the law and legal authorities: Evidence from the Caribbean’, Law and Society Review,
48, 4 (2014), p. 948.
62. See Afrobarometer, ‘Summary of results, Afrobarometer, round 6, survey in South
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can help us unpack this puzzle, inviting alternative conceptualizations of
citizen-court engagements.
First, the vast corpus of literature on procedural justice and legitimacy
concentrates on a small number of states in the Global North and may
not be ‘empirically valid’ in these places, let alone in strikingly different
contexts.63 Transplanting theoretical models from the idiosyncratic expe-
rience of these states creates ‘contextless generalizations’ on legitimacy.64
This has generated calls to ‘rethink the conceptual structure of perceptions,
judgments, and feelings about the law and legal authorities’ in post-colonial
contexts.65 Despite decades of scholarship calling for African states and
citizens to be understood on their own terms,66 citizens are all-too-often
characterized as viewing state institutions in Africa with near ‘blanket ille-
gitimacy’ when actually there is widespread faith in ‘the state’s right to
arbitrate’ that demands adequate theorization.67
Second, the notion of legitimacy itself has been under-theorized in the
procedural justice literature. Methodologically, procedural justice mod-
els take insufficient account of the complexity of variables—such as trust,
obligation, and legitimacy—which are simplistically reduced to tick-box
categories in large-scale surveys or treated as synonymous rather than dis-
tinct. Analysing the Afrobarometer data at a continent-wide level, for
example, Dreier and Lake highlight that ‘individual trust’ and ‘perceived
legitimacy’ are not necessarily co-variant.68 Contrary to the predictions of
procedural justice–legitimacy models, they find that people’s belief in the
authority of state legal institutions to arbitrate and govern is ‘surprisingly
unaffected’ by ‘negative personal experiences’ of rule of law institutions and
personnel.69 On the other hand, Tankebe argues that compliance should
not be read as a proxy for legitimacy, as compulsion may emerge from ‘fear,
a sense of powerlessness, or pragmatic acquiescence’.70
These critiques encourage more grounded ways of conceptualizing cit-
izen engagement with lower state courts. As theoretical and empirical
studies of statehood across Africa demonstrate, state institutions should
be seen as dynamic institutions of public authority ‘deeply embedded in
results, Afrobarometer, round 6, survey in Uganda’ (2016), Q.53e; Q.53g; Q.52H; Q52J
and Q42A.
63. Johnson et al., ‘Public perceptions’, p. 947.
64. Justice Tankebe et al., ‘Multi-dimensional model of police legitimacy: A cross-cultural
assessment’, Law and Human Behaviour, 40, 11 (2016), pp. 11–22.
65. Johnson et al., ‘Public perceptions’, p. 971.
66. Mbembe, On the postcolony.
67. Dreier and Lake, ‘Institutional legitimacy’, pp. 1209–1210.
68. Ibid., p. 1194.
69. Ibid., p. 1195.
70. Justice Tankebe, ‘Viewing things differently: The dimensions of public perceptions of
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social forces’ and in ‘struggles for social control’.71 A whole range of influ-
ences shape imaginaries of statehood and by extension state institutions,
including personal and vicarious experiences of these institutions, as well
as broader histories of statehood, citizenship, and subjection; personal and
collective struggles for rights and recognition; religious and cultural norms;
folk memories; economies of survival, accumulation, and exploitation; and
social relations that run the gamut from love to contempt.72 From this
perspective, legitimacy is not ‘a fixed absolute quality against which actual
conduct [can] be measured’.73 Instead, it is fluid and multidimensional,
being both ‘dialogic and relational in character’74 and part of a ‘continu-
ous and precarious social process’.75 Crucially, legitimacy is also only one
part of people’s ongoing calculation around the utility of courts and the
relationship of law to the “rest of life”. While engagements with the courts
(and perceptions of them) can be based on substantive values and norms;
they may also be shaped by convenience and compulsion. Such ‘instru-
mental/prudential’ compliance still involves a decision to defer authority to
the court but might be based on a range of pragmatic and self-interested
calculations that cannot be automatically equated with legitimacy.76 By
complicating and decentring ‘legitimacy’ as an explanatory variable for
engaging with lower state courts, we are better equipped to analyse the
everyday lives of these institutions and the range of influences that shape
how judgements are formed about them.
A summons to the magistrates’ courts: Normative, strategic, and pragmatic
drivers and dynamics
Our tri-factor approach to understanding magistrates’ courts in South
Africa and Uganda balances the desire to delineate core drivers of court
engagement with the need for a flexible, inductive framework of inquiry,
namely how people think the courts should act, how they need them to act,
and how they expect them to act in any given instance. We do not claim
to explain the precise relationship between these considerations, which
is always variable, nor can we quantify mono-causal reasons for citizen
engagement with, and perceptions of lower state courts, because they are
unlikely to exist. More modestly, we seek to show the complex motivations
71. Hagmann and Peclard, ‘Negotiating statehood’, pp. 542–545.
72. Nagin and Telep, ‘Procedural justice’, p. 7.
73. Lund, ‘Twilight institutions’, p. 693.
74. Bottoms and Tankebe, ‘Procedural justice’, p. 129.
75. Beatrice Jauregui, ‘Beating, beacons and big men: Police, disempowerment, and de-
legitimation in India’, Law and Social Inquiry, 38, 3 (2013), pp. 643–669.
76. Anthony Bottoms, ‘Compliance with community penalties’, in Anthony Bottoms,
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of court users, their varied experiences within the courts, and the differ-
ent conclusions they draw from these interactions. Thematic analysis of
our data allowed us to identify widespread patterns and themes in people’s
interactions with the courts which proved important across varied inter-
sections of class, age, and gender. Whilst there is limited space within this
article to further unpack the impact of people’s structural positions and
identities on court use, the framework we propose provides the analytical
space to do so, and this would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Fur-
ther, while our multi-sited study was designed for theory-building rather
than comparative analysis, we highlight similarities and differences between
sites where they emerge.
Normative engagements: How people think the courts should act
The first element in the constellation above is normative. It acknowledges
the important role that ideas about the state can play in explaining people’s
recourse to the courts. In any polity, imaginaries of the state are diverse and
can be put to varied ends. Sometimes, officials can hide behind ideas about
the state. At other times, state imaginaries may be repurposed and used to
resist and challenge state practices. When citizens in Harare appealed to
magistrates’ courts for justice following politically motivated violence, for
example, they held to the idea of a rule-bound state despite their experi-
ences and secured a ‘degree of success’ in the process.77 Similarly, in DRC,
despite extensive corruption, access problems, and inefficiency, people use
the Justice of the Peace Courts because ‘the ideal of the law and the State
continues to fuel expectations and hopes among Congolese people with
regard to the legal system’.78 Meanwhile, in South Africa, eastern DRC,
and Côte d’Ivoire, growing numbers of women are reporting cases of sexual
violence to state authorities despite unsatisfactory interactions with judicial
institutions.79
Our empirical findings within South Africa and Uganda suggested sim-
ilar patterns. The courts exerted some pull as a normative space of public
authority and going to the courts could be both an expression and ‘perfor-
mance of citizenship’.80 In both sites, many minor criminal or civil cases
ended up in magistrates’ courts because non-state or hybrid dispute res-
olution had failed. The decision to enter a magistrates’ court, however,
was not necessarily choiceless. Even where people expected the process
to be slow, expensive, and abstruse, they could be motivated by a more
77. Verheul, ‘Zimbabweans are foolishly litigious’, p. 83.
78. Rubbers and Gallez, ‘Court’, p. 103.
79. Lake, Strong NGOs and weak states; Lake, Muthaka and Walker, ‘Gendering justice’;
Medie, ‘Rape reporting’.
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abstract and normative conviction that taking an issue to court was the
correct course of action and that they may find a (comparatively) benign
adjudicating authority there rooted, to greater or lesser degrees, in their
sociopolitical values.
Thus, for some, acting responsibly—or ‘properly’—was a norm that
could be linked to ideas of statehood and/or citizenship and sustained
regardless of the costs or the outcomes of the state justice system. Nhlanhla,
a young man from KwaMashu, for example, remained committed to
reporting issues, despite the criminal justice system failing him personally.
He explained this in terms of his own normative notion of civil duty: ‘I will
continue to report [to the Police] because what I understand as a civilian
person [is that] I need to obey the rules. I don’t have to take the law to
my hands.’81 Similarly, in Gulu, Boniface opened a criminal trespass case
against a neighbour, after local leaders failed to resolve the issue, partly
due to an uncooperative accused. In some places, he said, we might ‘just
pick spears and begin to fight’, but he and his family chose to ‘handle it
in the most proper way… we wanted to just to take the legal ways’.82 He
saw this as an act of ‘wisdom’ to keep things ‘cool’ despite the costly delays
and expense it brought and the likelihood that the accused—a wealthy and
politically connected individual—would resolve the issue through bribes.
It was not just accusers and complainants who expressed normative faith
in the probity of the court. Nobuhle, who had been called to the Ntuzuma
small claims court for non-payment of school fees, recalled feeling hope-
ful that her case was being escalated, ‘I said let me go to court because
that is where I will tell them what is happening’: this was an arena in
which she felt she could be heard.83 Similarly, in Gulu, Moses, a young
subsistence farmer, accused of arson by an older, richer man, endured
remand in prison for four long months before being granted bail but still
expressed confidence in the court: ‘because that is where the real facts come
from’.84 Sometimes a normative commitment to the state justice system
was expressed as part of an accused’s reasoning for contravening the law
in the first place. Nkanyiso faced charges at Ntuzuma Court after assault-
ing a whoonga smoker85 who he had been trying to move from outside a
neighbours’ house after a call to the police went unheeded. ‘When I hurt [a
person] using my hands, I am infringing on their right…’ he acknowledged,
‘I must rather report the problem to the authorities’. However, for Nkany-
iso, the failure of state authorities to fulfil their duty was a justification for
81. Interview, Nhlanhla, eThekwini, 5 September 2013.
82. Interview, Boniface, Gulu, 11 August 2017.
83. Interview, Nobuhle, eThekwini, 25 July 2015.
84. Interview, Moses, Gulu, 26 July 2016.
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him to pursue justice by other means: ‘if they [the police] are failing, they
then tell me to do as I see fit’.86
Acknowledging the pull of state imaginaries is important, but we should
not constrain what ‘statehood’ means to different people. When we high-
light normative ideas of the state, we are not suggesting that people
were attracted by a homogenous imaginary of liberal governance. In both
Gulu and Ntuzuma, in different ways, state imaginaries could blur liberal
conceptions of the state with notions such as patriarchy, personalized
rule, ethnic chauvinism, liberation politics, radical redistribution, and
gerontocracy. The pull of the courts, therefore, is more accurately
described as the pull of ‘general and imprecise’ conceptions of statehood,
rooted in fluid ‘moral matrices’.87 In Gulu for example, a magistrate
explained that in civil land cases, people regularly turned to the court
because they believed he was a ‘direct channel’ to the President, who,
whilst campaigning, had promised favourable land dispute settlements.88
While this may be incongruent with idealized, Weberian conceptions of
how rational-legal state justice institutions should function, it still rep-
resents a normative idea about the role of the state in the arbitration of
disputes.
Strategic engagements: How people need the courts to act
A second element in this trifactor highlights instrumental desires that peo-
ple pursue through the courts. We call this strategic legalism: the calculated
use of a court case—and by proxy, ‘the state’—as leverage to obtain redress,
revenge, or closure in an ongoing dispute. Sometimes, court action might
be pursued whilst the same issue was also being negotiated outside the
courtroom. Such tactics are evident from debt cases in DRC to land
cases in Tanzania.89 Alternatively, criminal charges might be brought or
fabricated to catalyse resolution in a case that had already reached the
courtroom. This was particularly common during civil land cases in Gulu.
Following Griffiths and Weeks, we advocate a dispute-focused analysis to
make sense of these dynamics.90 By exploring the life of a dispute, we can
examine an altercation as it moves into, out of, and beyond the courts
86. Interview, Nkanyiso, eThekwini, 11 August 2016.
87. Tim Kelsall, ‘Political legitimacy in middle Africa: Father, family, food’, African Affairs,
102, 409 (2003) pp. 667–669; Michael Schatzberg, ‘Power, legitimacy and democratisation
in Africa’, Africa, 63, 4 (1993), pp. 445–461; Lentz, ‘The Chief’.
88. Interview, Magistrate, Gulu, 1 July 2016.
89. Rubbers and Gallez, ‘Beyond corruption’, p. 251; Kelly Askew, Faustin Maganga and
Rie Odgaard, ‘Of land and legitimacy: A tale of two lawsuits’, Africa, 83, 1 (2013), pp.
120–141.
90. Anne Griffiths, ‘Reconfiguring law: An ethnographic perspective from Botswana’, Law
and Society Inquiry, 23, 3 (1998), p. 613; Sindiso Mnisi Weeks, ‘Women’s eviction in Msinga:
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and as it triggers a diverse range of social, economic, political, and legal
manoeuvres.
In Gulu, strategic legalism was mainly linked to the area’s ubiquitous
land conflicts. During the war, almost the entire Acholi population were
displaced into camps and on people’s return, land boundaries, based on
customary usage, became highly contested.91 The regional State Attorney
lamented the quantity of civil land cases mounting on his desk. Other offi-
cials were frustrated about the escalation of land disputes using so-called
‘manufactured’ criminal charges such as ‘criminal trespass,’ ‘malicious
damage’, and ‘simple defilement’.92 In the words of one magistrate: ‘I read
the case summary, you see the story, and you say to the state attorneys, are
you going to get a conviction?! Really?! You will not get a conviction. These
are concocted summaries’.93 This, of course, raises important questions
(beyond the scope of this article) about why and how such cases reach the
courts in the first place. Suffice to say, one magistrate estimated that 80 per
cent would be dismissed due to lack of evidence.94 By this point, however,
the accused was likely to have spent many months in prison on remand or
have been subjected to the stress, disruption, and expense of several court
hearings. In 2017, an estimated 52 per cent of Ugandan prisoners were
pretrial detainees and 20per cent of those had spent three or more years
awaiting trial.95 For many accusers, this punishing limbo was the end goal:
‘it is a way of keeping people out of the way, or hurting them,’ explained
a magistrate.96 To fully appreciate the power and purpose of magistrates’
courts, it is important to realize that citizens may be seeking to repurpose
this institution to serve a diverse range of ends including, but not limited
to, justice.
Strategic legalism could also take the form of launching counter-cases
in situations where defendants wanted to re-frame themselves as victims
or simply to wear down the resolve of their accuser. These were evident in
Ntuzuma’s court. Siboniso, for example, had been attacked by his neigh-
bour, who in turn opened up an assault case against him. Whilst these
charges were later dropped, Siboniso was forced to attend court as accuser
and defendant. Although this had not succeeded in forcing him to drop
91. Julian Hopwood and Ron Atkinson, ‘Land conflict monitoring and mapping tool for the
Acholi sub-region’ (Human Rights Focus, Gulu, 2013).
92. See also: Lynn Khadiagala, ‘The failure of popular justice in Uganda: Local councils
and women’s property rights’, Development and Change, 32, 1 (2001), p. 60.
93. Interview, Magistrate, Gulu, 11 August 2017.
94. Interview, Magistrate, Gulu, 1 July 2016.
95. Foundation for Humanitarian Rights Initiative, ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’,
(Kampala, 2017).
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the case, his perseverance had cost him his job as a contractor.97 Strate-
gic legalism is also a tactic that could be used by the state. When Sicelo,
a young man, attempted to open up a case of assault against the police,
the police opened a counter-charge against him. That case was eventu-
ally withdrawn because the police did not regularly attend the hearings.
Sicelo, on the other hand, had persistently attended every court date, and
this had cost him a job contract.98 These examples, and others from both
sites, are a reminder of the economic, social, and emotional toll that long
delays had on court users. Many would have agreed with the conclusion of
Malcolm Feeley in his study of lower criminal courts in New Haven, USA:
‘the punishment is the process’.99
While a legal case could provide powerful leverage in social disputes, it
might also produce relational ruptures that were too costly to maintain.100
For some, however, exiting the court system could prove challenging. This
was particularly true with criminal cases in Uganda and South Africa,
which are prosecuted by the state. If a complainant wished to withdraw
charges, they had to persuade prosecutors to do so. In Gulu, where mon-
etary exchange was such an integral part of the system, this could be paid
for. It was harder in Ntuzuma where this was not an accepted norm. Court
officials were judged by successful prosecutions and bound by regulations
regarding the withdrawal of cases involving women and children.101 Where
these cases continued, people might try to mitigate the social ruptures they
caused. In one case of assault against a minor, for example, the original
complainants were unable to withdraw their charges against their neigh-
bour, which they now regretted.102 Consequently, they advocated on their
neighbour’s behalf, entering a statement into mitigation.
Whilst a full analysis of ADR is beyond this article’s scope, noting its
impact on strategic legalism in South Africa is important. ADR can enter
at all stages of the legal process, but typically in Ntuzuma, it entered at the
pretrial stage, with authorization of the prosecutor and the agreement of the
parties involved.103 Mediation was undertaken by trained mediators and
social workers, and successful resolution could include a range of actions,
including apologies and compensation. Successful pretrial ADR often led
to cases being withdrawn.104 Thus, ADR provided a flexible format for
97. Interview, Siboniso, eThekwini, 30 July 2015.
98. Interview, Sicelo, eThekwini, 29 July 2016.
99. Malcolm Feeley, The process is the punishment (Russell Sage Foundation, New York,
1979).
100. Cooper-Knock and Owen, ‘Vigilantism’.
101. Interview, Magistrate1, eThekwini, 29 July 2015.
102. Author one fieldwork diary, 22 July 2016.
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those seeking ends other than just prosecution, which was often the case
in gendered and intergenerational disputes. Those involved in the process
saw this flexibility as a strength, ‘people want to know “why did you do it?”
or “sorry” or compensation, everybody doesn’t want to see you at the back
of the court, or in a cell, or with a conviction, no not that’.105 Many who
came through the process were ‘friends, relatives, neighbours’ and could
include those who had initially sought prosecution but changed their minds
as well as those who had always maintained sentiments like, ‘I don’t want
him to be arrested I want to just talk’.106
Once we know how varied people’s motives are in coming to court, we
start questioning the degree to which conventional measures of success and
legitimacy in the state justice system actually reflect grassroots priorities.
Conviction rates are often used as a measure of success within the crim-
inal justice system, as debates over SDG 16.3 indicators showed.107 This
assumes, however, that conviction is what people seek.108 In fact, they
may be using court procedures to shame, manipulate, or inconvenience the
accused and will attempt to drop the court case when they have achieved
this end.109 Indeed, to see a case through to its conclusion can create a per-
manent rupture or mark on a relationship that many can ill afford.110 We
gain far more insight by looking beyond these figures, to explore how and
why people appealed to the law in the first place, and with what broader
effects.111
Evolving engagements: How people expect the court to function
Finally, we turn to people’s evolving expectations of the courts, which are
shaped both by engagements with ‘real governance’ in the courts; shared
stories of such encounters; and broader imaginaries of statehood.112 While
it may be true, as Tamanaha argues, that state courts are ‘frequently seen
as corrupt, dysfunctional, biased, too expensive, too distant, too delayed,
or too unfamiliar and unaccountable,’113 these sentiments are not a reli-
able predictor of people’s actual interactions with, and perceptions of,
the magistrates’ courts. As argued above, people could turn to the courts
because of their procedural shortcomings, seeking to harness them for their
105. Ibid.
106. Interview, Mediator, eThekwini, 28 July 2017.
107. See for example, Gary Milante, Suyoun Jang, Hynjung Park and Kyungnam Ryu,
‘Goal 16: The IndicatorsWeWant’ (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015).
108. Cooper-Knock and Owen, ‘Between vigilantism and bureaucracy’.
109. Crook, ‘State courts’, p. 11.
110. Cooper-Knock and Owen, ‘Between vigilantism and bureaucracy’.
111. Verheul, ‘Zimbabweans are foolishly litigious’, p. 80.
112. Thomas Bierschenk and Jean Paul Olivier de Sardan, States at work: Dynamics of African
bureaucracies (Brill, Leiden, 2014); De Herdt and de Sardan, Real governance.
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personal ends. In other cases, people turned to the courts despite these
shortcomings, cognizant of the ‘practical norms’ at play.114 In some cases,
as Bierschenk noted in Benin, ‘informalization’ and ‘privatization’ strate-
gies clearly served as ‘relief strategies’ to keep the legal system going in a
context of severe resource constraints.115
As we argue below, for example, relational ties and/or monetary
exchanges are leveraged to different degrees in both South Africa and
Uganda. These processes triggered diverse reactions (from resentment to
acquiescence), but they did not lead to systematic avoidance or disen-
gagement with the court system. Conversely, people did not always find
displays of procedural regularity and professionalism by court officials to
be inclusive, appealing, or just.116 Understanding the role of practical
norms, as well as deeply context-specific understandings of qualities like
‘professionalism’, presents a real empirical challenge to procedural justice
theories, which assume an arithmetic relationship between abstract metrics
of procedural regularity, legitimacy, and court usage.
In South Africa, the ability to move a case through the criminal jus-
tice system could be facilitated by ‘contact calling’,117 particularly within
the police. This broad phenomenon could simply be a plea for procedu-
ral attention, as it was when people obtained the cell phone details of a
named detective on their case recognizing that, in an overloaded system,
cases needed to be actively prioritized to progress. At other times, contact
calling occupied a liminal space—for example, ensuring that police discre-
tion was fully utilized in your favour—or subverted formal procedure.118
The relational obligations upon which people drew when contact calling
were diverse, and the act did not necessarily include monetary exchange.
Contact calling was not absent in Ntuzuma Court but seemed less preva-
lent than in the police and beyond the reach of most we interviewed. Within
the court, many officials policed a fierce divide between ‘professionalism’
and ‘corruption’. To the degree that money exchanged hands illicitly, it did
so in limited and surreptitious ways. Nonetheless, many had a lingering
suspicion that corruption lurked in all corners of the state.119 Sometimes,
the expectation of corruption itself opened the door to corrupt practices.
One official in Ntuzuma, for example, relayed the story of an official in
another court who had grown acclimatized to the sentences that a particular
magistrate dispensed for certain crimes. The official used the magistrate’s
114. De Herdt and de Sardan, ‘Introduction’, p. 5; Thina Nzo, ‘Provincial-regional ANC
politics in the Northern Cape: Corruption or everyday informal practices?’, Commonwealth
Journal of Local Governance, 19 (2017), pp. 96–118.
115. Bierchenk, ‘Everyday functioning’, p. 105.
116. Bierschenk and de Sardan, States at work.
117. Cooper-Knock, ‘Everyday policing’.
118. Interview, Siboniso; Bheka, eThekwini, 15 August 2016.
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procedural predictability to their advantage, claiming to those awaiting trial
that they could purchase a more lenient sentence, which was, in prac-
tice, the magistrate’s norm.120 That official’s scheme rested on the paradox
of steadfast official practice and imaginaries of corruption.121 Ultimately,
those imaginaries were being simultaneously confirmed and refuted.
InGulu, the illicit exchange ofmoney was endemic and every interviewee
who had engaged in the state legal process—practitioners and citizens—
acknowledged it as such. According to one lawyer, corruption ‘is’ the
system. As Hopwood argues, talk of visiting the courthouse to ‘buy law’
in Gulu is not unusual.122 Take Julius, for example, a man who helped his
friend (who he believed to be innocent) avoid conviction for ‘simple defile-
ment’. After his friend’s bail application was, in his eyes, unjustly denied,
he paid the court clerks a visit. The clerk explained that he needed 200,000
Ugandan Shillings (UGX), which would be divided between him, the pros-
ecutor, and the magistrate. Subsequently, his friend was granted bail and
his case repeatedly adjourned until the complainant ‘gave up’ because they
could not afford the necessary travel costs.123 Another man, Dennis, and
his wife, Eunice, also ‘took the bribery way’, to have a friend released on
bail. They were encouraged by a senior prosecution official who explained
that it would be ‘more cost effective’ than hiring a lawyer.124
Crucially, though, there was no romanticized binary between a non-
corrupt ‘traditional’ or ‘local’ system and a corrupt formal state system.
There was also no fixed relationship between the exchange of money and
the functioning of the system. In some cases, monetary bribes (often
called ‘appreciation’ in Gulu) eased the rate at which information and
bureaucracy flowed but did not shift the direction of verdicts. In other
cases, justice—or its subversion—came at a clear price. And where peo-
ple believed that justice had not been served, they did necessarily give up
on the process. In Gulu, the appeals that many launched demonstrated a
continued confidence in the court as an institution of regulatory authority,
despite the negative personal encounters people endured.125 As Robert—a
schoolteacher embroiled in a long-running civil land case, marked by severe
delays, unforeseen costs, and perceived corruption—noted, ‘Today, when
the court makes a judgment, someone goes to appeal. That appeal will take
120. Author one fieldwork diary, 24 July 2015.
121. For a discussion of perceptions of corruption see Nzo, ‘Provincial-regional ANC
politics’.
122. Julian Hopwood, ‘Truth, evidence and proof in the realm of the unseen’, Africa@LSE,
23 November 2018, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/11/23/truth-evidence-and-
proof-in-the-realm-of-the-unseen-part-i/>.
123. Interview, Julius, Gulu, 17 August 2017.
124. Interview, Dennis and Eunice, Gulu, 1 August 2016.
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years, until someone dies. That is common practice here – to carry on that
case until one dies’.126
Just as procedural irregularities did not stop people from using courts,
procedural regularities and performances of professionalism did not always
make the courts more appealing. Professionalism is a value that is honed
relationally: we are what others are not. This process of distinction—in
dress, discourse, documentation, and demeanour—often created a sense
of mystification amongst court users, something that has been noted in
plenty of other contexts.127 Sometimes, this was deliberate, with ‘pro-
fessional’ distinction and distance being produced through direct disdain
and ridicule. One man in Gulu, whose untrained brother was acting as
attorney in a criminal trespass case, recalled how the magistrate rebuked
them for ‘behaving like someone from the bush’ because they did not know
what an affidavit was.128 In Ntuzuma, those who opted to represent them-
selves at trial were often publicly quizzed by magistrates on the minutiae
of law to demonstrate that this decision was misguided. Those standing
in the wrong place, speaking at the wrong time, or attending in clothes
that were considered insufficiently ‘respectable’ were quietly mocked or
publicly reprimanded. Professionalism was thus neither necessarily posi-
tive nor affirming by court users who felt ‘shy… fearful’ and ‘scared’ by
their encounters in the court.129
Moreover, procedural justice theory claims that the procedurally correct
administration of law renders it just.130 When courts are implementing laws
regarded as fundamentally unjust, however, they can be seen as simultane-
ously procedurally sound and fundamentally illegitimate. Racist apartheid
laws, for example, were not rendered legitimate when enforced in a pro-
cedurally correct fashion. Similarly, in the jurisdiction of Ntuzuma Court
today, some informal settlement residents break the law by creating infor-
mal connections to the national power grid. Considering their actions
illegal but legitimate, these residents would consider a sentence against
them illegitimate even if it was procedurally just. This relationship is not
always straight forward. In Ntuzuma, for example, Nobuhle, who we met
above, was distraught when a child rape case in which she was involved
reached a ‘not guilty’ verdict. She blamed the level of recall—precise dates
and times—that the courts required, which young and traumatized individ-
uals could not offer. In place of what she regarded as procedurally correct
injustice, she advocated for magistrates to hold more flexible and punitive
powers.
126. Interview, Robert, Gulu, 11 August 2017.
127. Pat Carlen, Magistrates’ justice (M Robertson, London, 1976).
128. Interview, Boniface, Gulu, 11 August 2017.
129. Interview, Margaret, Gulu, 12 August 2017.






/afraf/article/119/477/552/5969485 by guest on 14 January 2021
A SUMMONS TO THE MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 575
Ultimately, what court users craved were professionals who could both
render the legal system legible to them and render the realities of their lives
legible to the legal system. This was something more than professionalism
and procedural regularity could afford, particularly in a context where few
could afford private attorneys. In Gulu, legal aid was virtually non-existent.
In South Africa, means-tested legal aid was a vital but overburdened ser-
vice. Legal aid attorneys held private consultations, but on simple criminal
cases where clients were pleading guilty, consultations were often muttered
from the dock, as the attorneys took instructions and details for mitigation.
In both Gulu and Ntuzuma, limited legal representation meant that court
users regularly turned to court orderlies, clerks, interpreters, and other
administrative staff to literally and figuratively find their way around the
court.131 Such side conversations often happened in the time gaps between
court business and in the physical gaps created by court architecture, which
shaped who could hear, see, and interact with whom.132 The advice that
people received was mixed. Officials might take great pride in relaying the
system but could also provide hurried responses or use such interactions
as a chance to seek bribes from those seeking assistance.
This section demonstrates that by understanding complex expectations
of ‘real governance’ in the magistrates’ courts, we gain insights into how
statehood is performed and perceived in lower state courts. While not
underestimating the damage done when institutions are captured by per-
sonal interests, we argue that policy-bound procedures are not necessarily
seen as useful, fair, or affirmative by all court users. Equally, ‘practical
norms’ around the exchange of money for services can be seen as play-
ing an effective role in regulating bureaucratic practices in the search for
redress.133 Whilst some felt that the courts remained reliable enough inso-
far as their procedural irregularities were legible and could be managed,
others opportunistically sought out courts in order to benefit from their
shortcomings, engaging in strategic legalism.
Conclusion
The literature on justice across Africa leaves us with a striking lack of
evidence about how and why people actually engage with ordinary mag-
istrates’ courts. This article has shown that it is possible to bring lower
state courts into focus without analytically pre-supposing that they are
central to the ordering of everyday life. We do not contest that there are
areas where the ‘power and authority of state law is “nominal rather than
131. Mwakajinga, ‘Access to justice’, p. 234.
132. Linda Mulcahy, ‘Architects of justice: The politics of courtroom design’, Social and
Legal Studies, 16, 3 (2007), pp. 383–403.
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operational”’.134 Nor do we contest that non-state actors can be quicker,
cheaper, and more capable of arbitration on issues of socio-economic con-
cern such as land and family disputes. Nevertheless, lower state courts are
part of the legal and justice landscape across Africa. Where they exist, they
operate. People are turning to the courts in large numbers and govern-
ments, donors, and civil society actors are seeking to expand their reach
and authority. Their long case lists should be seen not just as a point of
critique but a call to inquiry. These are institutions and sociolegal spaces
that are clearly worthy of study.
Our analysis has suggested how the academic blinkers on lower state
courts may have emerged and, drawing on new evidence from South Africa
and Uganda, what we gain by studying these courts. We show the diverse
norms, exigencies, and expectations at play when citizens engage with the
courts, and we demonstrate how experiences within the court room ful-
fil, challenge, and disrupt people’s ideas about how state justice should
and could function. Our empirical findings present a clear theoretical chal-
lenge to the causal predictions of procedural justice–legitimacy models that
undergird access to justice programming at the international and national
level. We find that people can be simultaneously deeply critical of their
government and its agents, whilst also conferring state institutions with
a degree of legitimacy. Moreover, there is no fixed relationship between
institutional usage, institutional utility, and institutional legitimacy.
Theoretically, our findings contribute to research on public authority and
empirical statehood by providing original insights into how people relate to
the state through the lower state courts. Our flexible model of institutional
engagement embraces normative, strategic, and pragmatic dynamics: it
considers how people think the court should act, how they need the courts
to act, and how they expect the courts to act in any given instance. Far
from being an abstract or detached institution, the magistrates’ courts
are a local regulatory arena where the possibilities of statehood remain
in motion. People are not simply subjected to magistrates’ courts. These
courts are actively drawn into the lives of disputes. In this process, peo-
ple seek to negotiate the terms of their engagement with these institutions
and the meanings they inscribe upon them. The ‘language of stateness’ in
the search for redress is not simply imposed, it is shared. This is hardly
particular to Africa. Arguments about people ‘personalizing the imper-
sonality’ of the state have been made from farming villages in Turkey to
council estates in the UK.135 In the midst of these normative, pragmatic,
134. Sally Falk Moore, Social facts and fabrications: “Customary” law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–
1980 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986), p. 150.
135. Insa Koch, Personalising the state: An anthropology of law, politics and welfare in austerity
Britain (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2018); Catherine Alexander, Personal states:
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and strategic encounters, procedural legitimacy remains unstable and an
unreliable guide to the use or value that people find in the courts.
Thus, we should not assume that access to justice programmes pro-
moting procedural fairness will necessarily make lower state courts more
‘legitimate’ nor that quantitative indicators for SDG 16 chime easily with
the motivations of court users. In a period of leveraged national and inter-
national support for access to justice, our findings should stimulate debate
and further research on the actually existing dynamics of lower state courts
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